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CORRUPTION AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' (FCPA) may strike most 
lawyers at first glance as a broad proscription of illegal payments 
by Americans to foreign government officials. The Act's inclu-
sion, by amendment, within the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 
labels the FCPA as part of the general securities regulation 
scheme. A close examination of the FCPA, however, leads to a 
different impression. First, the FCPA is not a broad proscription; 
the final Act forbids the authorization of those payments made 
"corruptly" with an intent to improve a business relationship. 
Second, the enforcement mechanism created in conjunction with 
the Act goes far beyond suppressing bribery; the accounting pro-
visions embodied in the FCPA are stepping stones in the path to 
a new control environment for corporate activities. Above all the 
FCPA must be construed in light of its multinational, multicul-
tural application, since the essence of the Act is to regulate activi-
ties abroad. 
The FCPA is not a traditional securities regulation. Primarily, 
the Act is a response to the widespread criticism of American 
corporations for violating the laws of other nations. 3 Since these 
violations were first uncovered by the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), the Congress has given the Commission a leading· 
role in regulating the activities of multinational corporations to 
enforce the FCPA. 
The SEC became involved in the problem of foreign bribery by 
American corporations indirectly. Investigations by the Water-
gate Special Prosecutor's Office into illegal domestic campaign 
' Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). The FCPA has been codified as follows: § 
102 of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2), (3) (Supp. I 1977); § 103 (except§ 103(b)(2)) of 
the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (Supp. I 1977); § 103(b)(2) of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) 
(Supp. I 1977); § 104 of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977). 
On May 5, 1977, the Senate unanimously passed a predecessor bill, S. 305, without 
amendment. The House, on Nov. 1, 1977, amended the Senate bill, substituting in its 
place a House version, H.R. 3815. The bill then went to the Conference Committee where 
the final Act was drafted. President Carter signed the Act on Dec. 19, 1977. It has not 
been amended as of this writing. 
• 15 U.S.C. 78a-78hh (Supp. I 1977). 
3 For the goals of Congress in passing the FCPA, see notes 20-29 and accompanying text 
infra. 
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contributions led that office to examine Americans' foreign cam-
paign contributions, regardless of whether those contributions 
were intended to remain abroad or were to be laundered for later 
use in the United States. Members of the SEC staff recognized 
that these corporate contributions were of sufficient interest to 
investors to warrant disclosure.4 The SEC inquiry into illegal con-
tributions revealed that the payments were made possible by 
falsified corporate financial statements which concealed the 
source and application of corporate funds. 5 These investigations 
also revealed the existence of slush funds from which money was 
discharged for bribes and other illicit purposes. 6 The existence of 
such hidden funds made financial statements filed with the SEC 
inaccurate.7 
This article first discusses the business activities and compet-
ing interests which prompted congressional action. Part II ana-
lyzes the FCPA and attempts to solve the ambiguities inherent 
in the criminalization provisions, 8 thereby clarifying which activi-
ties are proscribed by the FCPA and what is meant by the Act's 
' Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad; Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International Relations, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1975) (statement of SEC Commissioner Phillip A. Loomis, Jr.) 
[hereinafter cited as Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad]; SEC 
Reg. 13B-2, "Maintenance of Records and Preparation of Required Reports," 44 Fed. Reg. 
10,964 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13b2-l, 240.13b2-2). 
A recent note pointed out that the SEC can only demand disclosure of financially 
significant payments. Payments which are particularly large would probably fall within 
the disclosure requirements. See Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities Laws' Disclosure 
Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1976). Potentional investors would certainly be 
interested, for example, in the $4,300,000 which Gulf Oil paid in foreign political contribu-
tions, as well as the $4,800,000 Gulf paid domestically. Multinational Corporations and 
United States Foreign Policy; Hearings before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corpora-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (statement 
of Senator Frank Church) [hereinafter cited as Multinational Corporations and United 
States Foreign Policy]. 
• Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, at 36. 
• Id.· (statement of SEC Commissioner Phillip Loomis). 
7 These statements were filed pursuant to the registration requirements of §§ 13 and 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1976). The 
Exchange Act requires registration statements by certain securities issuers on an annual 
or quarterly basis. See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE, 289-92 (1976) -
[hereinafter cited as A. CONARD]. The SEC also became aware of bribery through routine 
investigations, such as were conducted in SEC v. United Brands, No. 75-0509 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 27, 1976), reprinted in [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,420, 
discussed in note 17 infra, in which the Commission investigated the company following 
the suicide of its chief officer. Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, 
supra note 4, at 37 (statement of SEC Commissioner Phillip Loomis). 
8 This article does not discuss Title II of the FCPA: The Domestic and Foreign Invest-
ment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977. Nor are the tax consequences under§ 162(c) or§ 
952 of'the Internal Revenue Code discussed here. See generally Note, Penalizing Bribery 
/'of Foreign Officials Through the Tax Laws: A Case for Repealing Section 162(c)(l), 11 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 73 (1977). 
' 
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corruption requirement. Finally, Part III examines the possibili-
ties for multinational agreements prohibiting bribery. 
I. THE ROLE OF QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS IN FOREIGN COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS. 
There is little new or startling in the revelation that American 
businessmen have made bribe payments while operating abroad.9 
The amounts of the bribes and the important positions of the 
recipients, however, were not fully appreciated by Americans 
until very recently. The final Senate Report10 on the FCPA al-
leged that over 300 United States companies had paid "hundreds 
of millions of dollars" to foreign government officials. 11 These vast 
sums were largely limited to certain industries, particularly the 
military weapons, aircraft, and oil industries. These revelations 
prompted Congressional action. 12 
Pressures on American companies to make illicit payments 
vary greatly. Payments have been made in a myriad of transac-
tions, but the following three patterns emerge: bribery for govern-
ment contracts, demands for protection money, and bribery for 
regulatory favors. 
In many foreign nations, particularly in the Middle East and 
Latin America, local agents have customarily been used to nego-
tiate contracts with local governments. Typically, a Defense Se-
curity Assistance Agency memorandum entitled "Agent's Fees in 
the Middle East, " 13 which was circulated among various Ameri-
can industries, strongly hinted that companies should pay lucra-
tive fees to local agents and should allow the agents discretion to 
distribute the money among local officials. As the memorandum 
suggested, " [ o ]bviously the agent with the greatest margin of 
the profit or percentage [sic] has a distinct advantage over those 
with a lesser fee in that greater 'influence' can be applied to all 
personnel in the governmental decision-making chain."14 This fee 
• Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, at 24, 28 
(statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State). 
1
• Senate Report of S. 305, S. REP. No. 95-114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in (1977] U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 
4098, 4100-4101. 
11 While newspaper reporters and several senators seemed convinced that over $200 
million had been spent on "agent's fees" and political contributions, more conservative 
sources have estimated expenditures at close to $60 million. Activities of American Mul-
tinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, at 100 (statement of Donald I. Baker, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Anti-Trust). 
12 For further discussion of the goals of the FCPA, see notes 20-29 and accompanying 
text infra. 
" Activities of Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, at 100. 
" Id. at 101. The agent's fee can vary from 5% to 20% of the contract price. See Letter 
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was often tacked on to the contract price and, in effect, paid by 
the foreign nation to the American corporation in a kick-back 
transaction, making the payment less objectionable to the corpo-
ration.15 
Some of the payments were not of the agent-commission nature 
but were simply protection money. For example, Gulf Oil was 
persuaded to contribute four million dollars to the ruling party 
in South Korea. This experience convinced Gulfs chairman that 
United States legislation was needed to protect business. 18 
A traditional objective of bribery is favorable legislation or reg-
ulation. An example of this type of corruption may be found in 
United Brands' payment to the president of Honduras in return 
for tax relief. 17 The preceding cases illustrate the type of extortion 
and corruption in which multinational corporations are involved 
abroad18 and illustrate the backdrop of the FCPA. 
from Alexander Hehmeyer to Philip Heymann (Oct. 5, 1978), reprinted in Wall St. J., Oct. 
17, 1978, at 26, col. 4. This letter also provides an intriguing description of the State 
Department attitude towards agents' fees. 
•• The deleterious effects on that corporation and on the United States foreign policy, 
however, remain the same, and comprise the primary goal of the Act. See note 20 and 
accompanying text infra. 
11 Political Contributions to Foreign Governments; Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 4-10, 54-55 (1975) (statement of Robert Dorsey) [hereinafter cited as Political 
Contributions to Foreign Governments]. 
Following the Korean War, the United States government sought to stabilize the gov-
ernment of South Korea by encouraging United States investment. Korea was given 
assistance through loans from the Agency for International Development to participate 
in joint ventures insured by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The Gulf refin-
ery in South Korea was the single largest private foreign investment in South Korea. In 
1966, high officials of South Korea's ruling Democratic Republic Party demanded a 
$1,000,000 campaign contribution from Gulf. The demand "left little to the imagination 
as to what would occur if the Company would choose to turn its back on the request." 
Gulfs Chairman, Robert Dorsey, paid the money believing the payments were in the best 
interests of the corporation. In the 1971 Korean election, the Party felt more insecure and 
won with only 51% of the popular vote. Consequently, a Mr. S. K. Kim, financial chair-
man of the Party, demanded $10,000,000 from Gulf. Mr. Dorsey was offended both by the 
amount and by Mr. Kim's rude, gangster-like approach, and so paid a mere $3,000,000. 
This apparently satisfied the Party. 
17 SEC v. United Brands, No. 75-0509 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1976 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 95,420, was the first case concerning multina-
tional bribery brought by the SEC. The company had advised shareholders of a reduction 
in the Honduras export tax. The company did not report that it had agreed to pay $2.5 
million in bribes. Eventually, United Brands only paid $1.5 million to the President of 
Honduras to reduce the local tax on bananas, one of the country's few exports. Following 
the disclosure of this information, the corporation's stock plunged 40%, its holdings in 
Panama were expropriated, and its tax and tariff concessions in Honduras were revoked. 
Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible? N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine) at 100, Col. 
2. [hereinafter cited as Gwirtzman]. Bribery of this type is omitted from the coverage of 
the FCPA through the business purpose limitation. See notes 136-139 and accompanying 
text infra. 
•• Many multinational corporations have responded by instituting strict policies against 
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These payment situations involve five parties: American-based 
corporations, foreign-based corporations, a nation to be influ-
enced by the bribe (or "bribe-target nation"), a nation which has 
corporations that compete with American corporations, and the 
United States government. 19 The competing interest of these par-
ties provide the actors upon whom the FCPA operates. 
The congressional objectives underlying the FCPA are difficult 
to simplify. While a plethora of policy considerations were pre-
sented during the congressional hearings, some concerns re-
curred. Perhaps the most frequently voiced was a concern over 
the public scandals engendered by bribery in major industrial 
nations.20 When an American corporation bribes a foreign govern-
ment official, the bribe reflects unfavorably on the United 
States.21 While a corporation may be legally distinct from the 
government, many foreigners see the corporation as an instru-
ment of United States policy. Hence, the United States is often 
blamed for a scandal in which the government played no part. In 
these circumstances, American companies are, in effect, making 
foreign policy for the government. Another congressional goal was 
to prevent the spread of corruption in friendly governments. Cur-
ruption weakens an ally's government by allowing improper influ-
ences to grow and diminishing respect among its people.22 A third 
goal was to prevent the distortion of commercial competition 
caused by bribery. 23 Bribery causes sales to be made not on the 
illicit payments. These include General Dynamics, DuPont and Pitney Bowes. Foreign 
and Corporate Bribes; Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign and Corporate 
Bribes]. 
" Additionally, there are divisions within the parties. American corporations include 
those which wish to pay bribes and those which abstain from such activities. Some bribe-
target nations are concerned about government officials accepting outside remuneration; 
others consider payments of this nature to be perfectly legitimate. Foreign competing 
industrial nations are also split between those which favor an elimination of illicit pay-
ments and those which feel such payments are not a problem. 
For a further discussion of the interests involved, see notes 186-192 and accompanying 
text infra. 
20 Congress was specifically concerned about scandals in Japan, Italy and the Nether-
lands. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-4. 
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3. 
22 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HousE 
REPORT]; Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad; Hearings on S. 
Res. 265 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 63 (1975), [hereinafter cited as Protecting the Ability of the 
United States to Trade Abroad]; Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 40; 
Abuses of Corporate Power; Hearings before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in 
Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 100 (1975), [hereinafter 
cited as Abuses of Corporate Power]. 
23 Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad, supra note 22, at 34, 
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basis of product quality, but on the amount of the bribe. How-
ever, where a payment is made as a legal, legitimate and integral 
part of the foreign nation's decision-making process, all competi-
tors should be on an equal basis before the law. This concern is 
reflected in the FCPA's corruption requirement.24 Fourth, the 
Congress wished to minimize foreign mistrust of American busi-
nessmen and to improve the American reputation for honesty in 
business dealings. 25 Thus, the Act creates domestic prohibitions 
for the purpose of aiding foreign governments in their attempts 
to prevent corruption. The Congress sought to avoid antagonizing 
foreign governments and so excluded foreign subsidiaries of 
American corporations from coverage of the Act. 28 Finally, the 
Congress did not wish to cripple unnecessarily American business 
activities abroad. To this end, a distinction was created between 
payments to discretionary and ministerial officials.27 Only pay-
ments to discretionary officials are proscribed.28 Furthermore, the 
House and Senate Conference Committee omitted from the cov~ 
erage of the Act29 bribes in furtherance of change in regulation or 
law. The policy behind this omission is unclear. 
II. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES: CORRUPTION, SECURmES 
ISSUERS, DOMESTIC CONCERNS, AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
The securities issuer provision, section 103 of the FCPA, 30 pro-
61; Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 88 (statement of Treasury Secretary 
Simon). · 
" 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. I 1977). See notes 58-110 and accompanying text infra . 
.. Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 63, 68. . 
21 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(l)(A) & (B). One experienced attorney recalled excruciating 
past problems with the extra-territorialization of United States commercial laws. Foreign 
and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 6-7. (statement of John J. McCloy). 
We went through this experience in connection with a determined attempt to 
extend our antitrust laws abroad. We then encountered heavy resentment on the 
part of foreign governments. Local laws were passed making it a crime to respond 
to any American subpoena. . . . In the end that effort to extraterritorialize our 
laws was generally repelled abroad and the urge to do so here was considerably 
moderated. 
21 See notes 112-120 and accompanying text infra. 
zs See notes 113-120 and accompanying text infra. 
21 For a discussion of the business purpose limitation, see notes 136-139 and accompany-
ing text infra. 
'° This section (except for § 103(b)(2)) amends § 30 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, creating § 30A, and is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. I 1977). The Section 
states: 
Sec. 103 "FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY ISSUERS" 
Sec. 30A. (a) It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities 
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or which is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of 
such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use 
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scribes payments by a securities issuer or certain persons con-
nected with an issuer to certain types of foreign government offi-
cials. The domestic concerns provision, section 104, enacts identi-
cal provisions for persons and domestic enterprises other than 
issuers covered by the securities issuer section. 
These sections focus particularly on bribery to influence a for-
eign official in his job performance, to cause the official to act or 
fail to act, or to prompt the official to exert his influence with 
others in the foreign government. The payment must be made 
corruptly31 and in order to assist the company in obtaining or 
retaining business with a person. If an issuer is found to have 
violated the securities issuer section, then employees and agents 
connected with that issuer may be prosecuted.32 Finally, these-
curities issuer section forbids any issuer from paying, directly or 
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in 
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment 
of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of 
anything of value to-
(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official 
capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his official functions; or 
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign 
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or 
decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such 
issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business 
to, any person; 
(2) any foreign political party of official thereof or any candidate for foreign 
political office for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate 
in its or his official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform its or 
his official functions; or 
(B) inducing such party, official or candidate to use its or his influence 
with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influ-
ence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order 
to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or 
directing business to, any person; or 
(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion of 
such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or 
indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, 
or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political 
party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, including 
a decision to fail to perform his or its official functions; or 
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or can-
didate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumen-
tality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government 
or instrumentality, 
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or 
directing business to, any person. 
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. I 1977). 
" See note 50 and accompanying text infra. 
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indirectly, a fine levied under the section against any person con-
victed of violating the Act. 
A. Issuers Covered by the Securities Issuer Section 
The FCPA forbids actions by only certain types of issuers and 
persons. The issuer's section pertains to those enterprises which 
issue a class of securities registered on a United States national 
securities exchange in accordance with the procedures under sec-
tion 12 of the Exchange Act, the general registration provision.33 
Consequently, those issuers with unlisted trading privileges 
which are deemed registered are also included.34 The issuer's sec-
tion also covers those securities voluntarily registered. 35 Those 
issuers who are required to file reports with the SEC, thereby 
excluding voluntary reporters, 38 are also covered by the FCPA. 
The Conference Committee deliberately excluded foreign sub-
sidiaries of American corporations operating abroad37 in order to 
avoid jurisdictional questions38 and unnecessary antagonisms 
with foreign governments. 38 Although Congress could have held 
33 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976). The Conference Committee Report incorrectly specifies that 
only issuers required to register under § 12(b) of the Exchange Act, which is the general 
registration statute, are covered by the FCPA. Compare H.R. CON. REP. No. 95-831, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977), [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT], reprinted in [1977] 
U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4098, 4124 with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (Supp. I 1977). 
" Unlisted trading privileges are deemed registered under § 12(0(6). The Conference 
Report does not specifically mention § 12(0(6) issuers. The Report mentions only§ 12(b) 
issuers. The wording of the FCPA, however, includes any issuer registered pursuant to § 
12, and this presumably includes those deemed registered under § 12(0(6). See § 103(a), 
codified at 15 U.S.C. 78dd-l(a) (Supp. I 1977). 
" Securities may be registered voluntarily pursuant to § 12(g) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
30 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (Supp. I 1977). Section 15(d) excludes an issuer from the duty to 
report during "any fiscal year, other than the fiscal year within which such registration 
statement became effective, if, at the beginning of such fiscal year, the securities of each 
class to which the registration statement relates are held of record by less than three 
hundred persons" (emphasis added). Section 15(d) is amended by § 204 of the FCPA, 
which authorizes the SEC to define the term "held of record." Finally, and particularly 
relevant to the FCPA, § 15(d) excludes "securities issued by a foreign government or 
political subdivision thereor• from the duty to report. 
" 123 CONG. REc. S19,399 (Daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire); 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 14. 
" The distinction between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce is an 
established concept in international law. See N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 110, 111 (1973). Congress lacks au-
thority under international law to forbid conduct by aliens in other countries, unless 
conduct outside the United States threatens "its security as a state or the operation of its 
governmental functions .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 33(1) (1965), 
quoted in United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 
(1968). See also Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
884 (1967) . 
., See note 26 supra. 
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the parent corporation responsible for the acts of its subsidiary 
under an agency theory,•0 it chose not to do so. Thus the issuer 
section requires that the United States issuer at least authorize 
payment. Furthermore, any agency theory prosecution is under-
cut by the issuer provision's requirement that an employee or 
agent of an issuer be subject to United States jurisdiction, 
thereby excluding foreign nationals working for American subsid-
iaries abroad. Still, if the parent corporation participates in the 
prohibited conduct, even if it is a postpayment authorization, the 
parent may be held liable.41 
B. Persons Connected with Issuers 
In addition to those issuers required to register or report by the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act, the securities issuer provisions of 
the FCPA also cover persons related to such issuers. The relation-
ship and purpose of payment required to establish liability, how-
ever, is unclear. The section is ambiguous as to whether officers, 
directors, employees, and agents must be acting on behalf of the 
issuer, as is clearly required for stockholders. The language of the 
Act indicates that officers and directors need not be acting on 
behalf of the issuer and may incur liability through actions of a 
personal or non-issuer business nature.42 This formulation repre-
sents a change between the Senate bill and the final Act. The 
Senate bill covered, "any officer, director, employee or 
stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer. " 43 The Senate 
Report accompanying the bill explained that the provision was 
intended to make clear that only corporate or business bribery 
would be prohibited.44 
'° See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). 
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977); 123 CONG. REC. H12,824 (daily ed. Dec. 
7, 1977). Some courts have raised the question of whether a corporation can be held 
criminally liable for the implicitly authorized acts of its officers: See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972). 
The federal courts have held corporations criminally liable if an officer has acted within 
the scope of his employment, whether or not his conduct was expressly authorized. Conti-
nental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
" See note 30 supra. 
'" (Emphasis added). SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 17. 
" "Whether or not a particular situation involves bribery by the corporation or by an 
individual acting on his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including the 
position of the employee, the care with which the board of directors supervises manage-
ment, the care with which management supervises employees in sensitive positions and 
its adherence to the strict accounting standards set forth in section 102." SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 11. 
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The Conference Committe changed the wording as if to indi-
cate a new meaning, but did not elaborate. 45 The final wording is 
"any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any 
stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, .... " 48 The 
new wording was repeated in the criminal penalties portion of the 
iss_uer section, 47 listing officers and the directors separately from 
stockholders, thereby seeming to require that only the stock-
holder be acting on behalf of an issuer. 48 A separation of required 
motive is indicated by the change in language, a change which 
could hardly be accidental. Therefore, an officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent need not be acting on behalf of an issuer in order 
to incur liability under the Act. For a payment to be proscribed, 
however, it must be made to obtain or retain business with a 
person.49 
With an eye to this distinction, a scenario may be drawn where-
in an officer or director of a corporation, without that corpora-
tion's authority, bribes a government official so as to allow that 
corporation to do business with a person. This situation may arise 
particularly with regard to lists of government-approved sup-
pliers or contractors. In such a case, the director or officer could 
be convicted under the FCPA.50 
The language of the Act clearly requires that the stockholder 
be acting "on behalf or' the issuer. The phrase "on behalf or' 
must be interpreted in connection with the business purpose limi-
tation in this section.51 In context, "on behalf or' means the per-
•• CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12. 
" (Emphasis added). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977). 
" Amending § 32A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. I 
1977). 
•• 123 CoNG. REC. H12,826 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977). 
" See notes 110-112 and accompanying text infra. 
50 Employees and agents are separated from other persons covered by 15 U.S.C. § 78ff, 
and their liability is conditioned upon the issuer's conviction. See note 175 infra. Officers 
and directors are the only persons who may be convicted without the issuer's participa-
tion; stockholders must be acting on behalf of the issuers. 
One possible policy explanation is that officers and directors have more control over 
issuers than do employees or agents. The House Bill, H.R 3815, included "any natural 
person in control of such an issuer," (emphasis added) along with any officer or director 
of an issuer. This provision was dropped in conference, but the idea may have survived 
in broader liability for officers and directors. Officers and directors have greater control 
and their liability may substitute for that of the issuer's. 
This interpretation is consistent with Congressional objectives in the field of securities 
laws, which are to protect the issuer's investors. When a corporate officer or director 
engages in bribery which is related to the corporation even though not for its benefit, that 
officer or director jeopardizes the corporation's standing in the foreign country. Investors 
are entitled to be protected from this behavior by the corporation's officers and directors. 
This type of protection for investors is not part of the general disclosure-oriented securities 
regulation regime. 
" See notes 136-139 and accompanying text infra. Since the purpose of the bribe must 
168 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 13:1 
son is paying corporation money to an official with the corpora-
tion's authorization.52 
C. Domestic Concerns 
The domestic concern section53 prohibits the same type of ac-
tivities by individuals and domestic companies that the securities 
provision does for issuers. Since this section excludes from cover-
age those firms covered by the securities issuer provision of the 
FCPA, "domestic concerns" and "issuers" are mutually exclu-
sive.54 
The House version of the FCPA was only slightly different in 
that it extended coverage to United States-controlled foreign sub-
sidiaries.55 The Senate version, accepted by the Conference Com-
mittee, required that the domestic concern (1) be owned and 
controlled by individuals subject to United States jurisdiction 
and (2) have its principal place of business in the United States. 
This conjunction was designed to avoid the jurisdictional, en-
forcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by extra-
territorializing the enforcement of this section.56 By including not 
only United States citizens, but any person subject to United 
States jurisdiction, Congress has provided for the prosecution of 
foreign nationals provided they act on behalf of a domestic con-
cern.57 
be to assist the issuer, the issuer always has a relationship with the proscribed payment. 
The phrase "on behalf or' denotes acting with the corporation's authority. 
12 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. 
113 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977). 
"' Section 104 of the FCPA excludes issuers covered by § 103 and covers "domestic 
concerns." "Domestic Concerns" are defined by§ 104 as 
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or 
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business 
trust, unincorporated association, or sole proprietorship which has its principal 
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a 
State of the United States or a territory, possession or commonwealth of the 
United States. 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(l) (Supp. I 1977). Jurisdiction is acquired if the individual has 
sufficient connection with the United States, if the concern has its principal place of 
business in the United States, or if the concern is organized under United States law . 
.. House Report on H.R. 3815, H.R. REP. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; 123 CONG. REC. Hll,932 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) 
(remarks of Rep. Eckhardt) . 
.. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 13-14 . 
• , Id. 
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D. "Corruptly in furtherance of" 
What makes an action "corruptly in furtherance of' gaining 
influence? This phrase is the most difficult language in the FCPA 
to interpret, yet some understanding of its relationship to bribery 
is necessary. The prosecutor or plaintiff58 must prove that the 
payment was made corruptly.59 
Congress has indicated an intent to allow the courts to use the 
corruption requirement for the exclusion of persons engaged in 
essentially benign transactions.6° For example, an extortion situa-
tion in which a foreign official threatened to destroy company 
property unless paid was explicitly excluded through the corrup-
tion requirement. 61 This hypothetical situation is extreme and 
non-controversial, but leaves uncertain the full parameters of the 
corruption requirement. 
To delineate activities which are corrupt, this section of the 
article reviews the case law relating to corruption and bribery and 
then proposes a definition which should be applied to the FCPA. 
The examination reveals that an illegal influence on the foreign 
.. The legislative history of the FCPA and the analysis used by the United States 
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) indicates that a private cause of action 
exists under the FCPA. See note 179 infra. 
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977). The burden of proving that the payment 
was made corruptly rests upon the prosecutor or plaintiff. The HousE REPoRT, supra note 
55, at 8, recommended that the courts look to the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
201 (1978), to interpret the FCPA. Under the domestic statute a corrupt intent must be 
proven by the prosecutor. See, e.g., United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1978); E. DEvrrr & C. 
BLACKMAR, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 34.05 (3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited 
as E. DEvnT & C. BLACKMAR]. 
'° The Senate Report explained: 
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer, promise or gift, 
must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order 
to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential 
legislation or a favorable regulation. The word "corruptly" connotes an evil mo-
tive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 10. 
The House Report on H.R. 3815 was vague as to its own definition of corruption. HousE 
REPORT, supra note 55, at 8. At one point it defines "corruptly" as connoting "an evil 
motive or purpose such as that required under [the domestic federal bribery statute]." 
The domestic bribery statute has been interpreted by the courts as requiring an inten-
tional violation, motivated by evil. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text infra. On the 
House floor, Representative Eckhardt explained that the "corrupt purpose must be to 
induce the recipient to influence any official act or decision of a government." 123 CONG. 
REc. Hll,932 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977). 
These statements give little guidance. The Senate Report specifies an "evil" motive, 
which is extraordinarily vague. The House comments are also unclear, since even a pay-
ment for a ministerial action, which is legal under the FCPA, would influence an official 
act. Thus, these legislative sources provide little or no guidance for understanding corrup-
tion. 
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nation's decision-maker is integral to bribery and corruption 
under the FCPA. 
1. Case law and analogous statutes - Common law bribery 
has evolved over the years and· the concept of "corruption" has 
normally been connected with bribery. 82 Statutes have expanded 
the notion of bribery, sometimes creating "improper gratuity" 
provisions which do not require a corrupt purpose.83 
The constitutional limits on what may be considered bribery 
were explored recently in United States v. Dansker,64 where the 
Third Circuit interpreted a New Jersey bribery statute85 in 
connection with the Travel Act, 88 which forbids the use of the 
facilities of interstate commerce with the intent to further any 
unlawful activity, including bribery. The state bribery statute 
forbade the giving or receiving of any money to obtain any "act 
or thing connected with or appertaining to" the government, 
without regard to corrupt purposes or the recipient's position. 
The vice-chairman of a local parking authority was convicted 
without proof that he had received the money in return for using 
his government position to aid the payor.87 The court reversed the 
conviction, holding that the statute must include a corruption 
requirement to avoid violation of the defendant's First Amend-
ment rights. The court stated: 
[l]n order to establish a violation of the statute, it must 
be demonstrated: (a) that the alleged recipient, whether 
he be a public official or not, possessed at least the appar-
11 See SENATE REPoRT, supra note 10, at 11. 
12 Bribery has been defined at common law as "the voluntary giving or receiving of 
anything of value in corrupt payment for an official act done or to be done with the corrupt 
intent to influence the action of a public official or of any other person professionally 
concerned with the administration of public affairs." 12 AM. JUR. 2d Bribery § 2 (1964). 
See also 18 U.S.C. § 20l(b) (1978); Vinyard v. United States, 335 F.2d 176, 182 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964). 
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(O-(h) (1976), discussed in note 85 infra. 
14 537 F.2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). Accord, United States 
v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137-38 (3rd Cir. 1977). 
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 93-6 (West 1953) provided: 
Any person who directly or indirectly gives or receives ... any money, real 
estate, service or thing of value as a bribe, present or reward to obtain . . . any 
. . . act or thing connected with or appertaining to any office or department of 
the government of the state . . . or other political subdivision thereof, or of any 
public authority, is guilty of a misdemeanor. · 
.. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1978). Bribery under the Travel Act includes not only common law 
bribery but any state statutes which may be classified as prohibiting bribery. United 
States v. Nardella, 393 U.S. 286, 295 (1968). 
17 The defendant was politically active and had been publicly opposed to a zoning 
variation for a real estate development. In return for $600,000 he reversed his stand and 
supported a modified construction plan. See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 44-
45 (1976). 
FALL 1979) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
ent ability to influence the particular public action in-
volved; and (b) that he agreed to exert that influence in a 
manner which would undermine the integrity of that pub-
lic action.68 
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Thus, the interest protected by bribery laws is the integrity of the 
public decision-making process; when a payment does not injure 
that integrity, it is not bribery. Although Dansker concerned a 
state statute, the FCPA must also be construed to avoid infring-
ing on the First Amendment. At rock bottom, "corruption" under 
the FCPA should therefore require an injury to the integrity of 
government decision making. 
The term "corruptly" has also been utilized by Congress in the 
federal perjury69 and domestic bribery statutes.70 Unfortunately, 
cases arising under these statutes have dealt with the issue in a 
cursory manner.71 Moreover, the cases have all concerned corrup-
tion in an exclusively American setting, where there exists a com-
monly understood standard of ethics and morality. By contrast, 
the FCPA concerns an international setting.72 
With respect to perjury, courts have required that an indict-
ment aver that sworn testimony was given "corruptly."73 
"Corruptly" in this context has been held to mean "viciously, 
[or] wickedly. " 74 The concepts of willfulness and voluntariness 
have also been employed in defining corruption in the context of 
perjury. 75 Although there is precedent to the effect that perjury 
18 Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
" 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury). The corruption requirement has been implied by the 
courts into the perjury statute. See Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 
1956); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1954). 
1
• 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (domestic bribery). "Corruptly" is also the level of intent 
required under the federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976). 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3rd Cir. 1958); United States 
v. Piazza, 148 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945). Dissatisfation with the vagueness in judicial con-
struction of the term "corruptly" prompted the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code to 
adopt a "pecuniary benefits" standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1, Status of Section 
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See also notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra. 
72 For a particularly poignant example of how the international setting can affect busi-
ness, see the plight of Translinear, Inc., as it attempted to rescue its plant from the 
Haitian government. Abuses of Corporate Power, supra note 22, at 115. 
"·united States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 623-24 (3rd Cir. 1954). The court stated that 
"[a]n essential element is that the defendant must have acted with a criminal intent -
he must have believed that what he swore to was false, and he must have had the intent 
to deceive. If there was a lack of consciousness of the nature of the statement made or it 
was inadvertently made or there was a mistake of the import, there was no corrupt 
motive." Id. at 622-23. All essential elements of a crime must be alleged in an indictment. 
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 7(c)(l) (1976); see also United States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657 
(D.D.C. 1966). 
" United States v. Edwards, 43 F. 67 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1890). 
,. United States v. Howard, 132 F. 325, 350-51 (W.D. Tenn. 1904). 
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corruption need not be willful, 78 more recent cases have held that 
a corrupt motive must include willfulness.77 Thus, an element of 
scienter, consciously breaking the law, is required. 78 
The domestic federal bribery statute79 uses the modifier 
"corruptly" in a manner similar to the FCPA, co-evasively with-
out providing a statutory definition. Under the domestic bribery 
law, corrupt intent must be alleged80 and proven.81 Cases show 
that a "corrupt" intent in domestic bribery indicates a greater 
degree of purpose than mere willful intent. The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit has implied that to take a 
payment "corruptly" bespeaks a higher degree of criminal knowl-
edge and purpose than does the mere illegal and improper dis-
charge of official duty.82 In another case,83 the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit defined a "corrupt act" as one "done volun-
tarily and intentionally, and with the bad purpose of accomplish-
ing either an unlawful end or result by some unlawful method or 
means."84 Both circuits; therefore, are in agreement that a cor-
rupt act must be done with the knowledge that it is illegal. The 
Ninth Circuit felt that proof of "specific intent" to knowingly 
violate the law was required.85 Furthermore, a hope or expectation 
" Id.; Holmgren v. United States, 156 F. 439, 444-45 (9th Cir. 1907); United States v. 
Edwards, 43 F. 67 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1890). 
77 United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 622-23 (3rd Cir. 1954); Link v. United States, 2 
F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1924). 
78 United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 622-23 (3rd Cir. 1954). 
" 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976). The House Report on H.R. 3815 strongly suggested that the 
courts look to this statute in defining "corruptly." HousE REPORT, supra note 55, at 8. 
80 Razete v. United States, 199 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 904 (1952). 
" United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Evans, 572 
F.2d 455, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1978); E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 59, at § 34.05. 
In United States v. Miller, 340 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965), the court affirmed a government 
supplier's conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. § 201, even though the trial judge refused a 
jury instruction that the money must have been given to a government employee with 
corrupt or fraudulent intent. The court held that the statute explicitly stated that an 
intention by the payor either to influence official behavior or to induce a breach of duty 
made the breacher culpable and that the additional common law caveat that the payor 
act with a "corrupt or fraudulent state of mind" was not a statutory requirement. Id., at 
425. This case, however, is inapposite to the FCPA because a corrupt state of mind was 
not an explicit statutory requirement prior to 1962, and the incident in Miller predated 
that enactment. 
82 United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The latter standard is 
from the improper gratuity section of 18 U.S.C. § 201. See note 85 infra. The court 
discussed the district court's definition of "corruptly" as "[acting] voluntarily and with 
a bad or evil purpose to accomplish an unlawful result." 506 F.2d at 80-82. 
83 United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978). 
•• Id. at 996. 
85 Id. Some cases might have been tried under the domestic bribery law, 18 U.S.C. § 
201(a)-(e) (1976), were instead prosecuted under the "improper gratuity" section,§ 201(O-
(h) (1976), because the latter sections do not require a corrupt purpose. Because they 
require a lesser intent, however, these sections carry a reduced penalty. See United States 
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of financial gain, either for the actor or another, is normally re-
quired.86 
In light of these cases, the term "corruptly" in the FCPA illu-
minates the level and extent of criminal intent required for a 
violation. Neither perjury nor domestic bribery cases have ever 
faced the issue of which nation's laws must be knowingly vio-
lated, or whether an evil motive in the United States is the same 
as in all other countries. Although there is little case law to help 
weigh the intent, a high degree of culpability, including knowl-
edge by the payor that the payment is unlawful, is unfailingly 
required. 87 
Prior to 1961, the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code included 
a corruption requirement in their model bribery statute.88 Dissat-
isfaction with the vagueness of the term caused the draftsmen to 
change the model statute to a "pecuniary benefit" standard, but 
not before the Reporter prepared a new conceptual definition of 
"corruptly." Louis B. Schwartz defined "corruptly" as meaning 
an "intent to secure an improper advantage or to introduce an 
improper consideration in determinations made by a public serv-
ant or other person sought to be influenced. "89 Here again, the 
central harm of corruption is the intentional distortion of the 
public decison-making process. 
2. A proposed definition of "corruptly" - Courts must cre-
ate a standard for determining what undermines the integrity of 
a decision-making process. Some methods of influencing deci-
sions are legitimate; only those involving an illegal method may 
be labelled "corrupt." Often, that method involves applying per-
sonally oriented pressure on the decision-maker so that he or she 
will disregard the criteria that should properly be used. 90 Since no 
definition of "corruptly" is given in the Act, a court should inter-
pret "corruptly" in light of the multinational, multicultural envi-
ronment of the FCPA. Even though the FCPA prohibits only 
those payments made through interstate commerce, the goal is 
v. Raborn, 575 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 80 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). 
81 E. DEVITI & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 59, at § 34.08. 
87 The federal law which governs political contributions to United States government 
officials or parties requires a contribution to be "knowingly" made, not "corruptly" made. 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441(j) (1976). Since Congress uses the 
two modifiers for intent covering a similar activity and since corrupt intent requires an 
"evil" motive, "corruptly" seems to denote a higher level of intent than "knowingly." 
81 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1, Status of Section (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
11 This definition is exerpted from CONFIDENTIAL COUNCIL DRAFr No. 30, p. 82, October 
21, 1961, and is reprinted with special permission of the American Law Institute. 
00 This approach is in accord with United States v. Daneker, 537 F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). See notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra. 
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clearly to prevent corruption abroad. 91 Therefore, a relative defi-
nition of "corruptly" is needed, one which is more explicit than 
the perjorative "evil" and which can be applied to a myriad of 
legal and social systems. 
Concepts of corruption vary from nation to nation.92 The mean-
ing changes depending on the context and social group in law, 
political science, sociology, religion or economics.93 A corrupt 
practice has been categorized by the United Nations as "a special 
type of process or technique for influencing decision-making."94 
This United Nations interpretation as well as that of the Reporter 
for the Mode Penal Code should be applied to the FCPA to reach 
a definition which is flexible enough to be applied to different 
decision-making systems. 
The word "corruptly" should be interpreted primarily with re-
spect to the laws of the nation which the payment was intended 
to affect. Under American law, corrupt intent requires harm to 
the integrity of the decision-making process, 95 an issuer's knowl-
edge that the payment is unlawful, 98 an evil purpose, 97 and an 
attitude showing willful disregard of the law. 98 That law which 
11 123 CONG. REC. Sl9,399 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Senators Proxmire, 
Brooke, and Williams). 
12 See McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments by Corpora-
tions: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1071 (1978). 
,. Scholars have distinguished between "conventional" and "functional" corruption. 
In applying these distinctions, we bear in mind the difference between 
conventional and functional definitions. The former exist in the usage of a partic-
ular social context, such as the United States at a given period. Functional dis-
tinctions are made for scholarly and scientific purposes; ultimately they have in 
view all social contexts and hence define terms for comparative analysis. 
A. RoGow AND H. LAssWELL, Power, Corruption and Rectitude 132-134 (1963), reprinted 
in POLITICAL CORRUPTION 54 (Heidenheimer, ed. 1970). 
Previous bribery statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976), have implicitly dealt with 
bribery in a "conventional" manner, since only the American government and American 
morality were involved. The advent of the FCPA requires a "functional" approach due to 
the multi-governmental effect. 
14 61 UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, Report of the Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. No. E/5838, 6, ,i 16 (1976)[hereinafter cited as U.N.E.S.C. Doc. E/5838). 
The U.N. Report further explains that, "[W)hat distinguishes [a corrupt practice) 
from other influencing processes or techniques is the method by which the influence is 
effected. Every society accepts and legitimizes certain methods in the pursuit of individ-
ual interests and condemns others, ethically or legally. Duress, fraud snd corruption 
belong to that latter category." Id. Thus, corrupt methods are those which are condemned 
by the society sought to be influenced. That society has the right to set its own standards. 
" United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 49 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Barash, 
365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Bowles, 183 F. Supp. 237, 248-49 (D. 
Me. 1958). 
" United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993,996 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brewster, 
506 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
" See note 60, supra. 
•• United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1954); Link v. United States, 2 
F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1924). 
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must be disregarded may be either substantive proscriptions of 
the FCPA alone or the FCPA together with local law.BB The mul-
tinational context of the FCPA, however, mandates that 
"corruptly" should mean knowingly and willfully intending to 
influence a foreign nation's decision-making through a payment 
forbidden by that nation's laws. 
While some foreign courts presume that a bribe willingly paid 
was corrupt, 100 this policy conflicts with American precedent 
under the domestic federal bribery statute.'01 The prosecutor 
should be required to show (1) that the defendant believed the 
payment was illegal, (2) that the payment was not extorted from 
him, ioz and (3) that the laws of the government meant to be influ-
enced by the payment did not countenance such a payment. This 
standard for "corruption" will lead to a just application of the 
FCPA without subverting the congressional goals of preventing 
American corporations from corrupting another nation's govern-
ment.103 
A relative definition of corruption will balance the major goals 
of Congress in passing the FCPA. First, the definition will prevent 
American corporations from offending foreign nations by violat-
ing their laws. If a foreign nation has declared a payment to be 
illegal and the payment is otherwise proscribed by the Act, then 
that payment will be illegal under American law as well. If the 
foreign nation, however, either favors these payments or is so 
unconcerned as not to proscribe them, then that nation is in no 
position to claim that the corporation has acted dishonestly. This 
interpretation would prevent the United States from being em-
harassed in the world press, since any payment which offends the 
bribe-target nation's laws would be deterred or punished by the 
United States as well. 
Another major congressional goal was to avoid crippling Ameri-
" Foreign governments may advise the United States federal courts of their laws by 
filing an amicus curiae brief. 17 Int'/ Legal Materials 1320 (1978). 
100 For example, Tanzania, pursuant to its Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, pre-
sumes a corrupt motive when a public officer is charged with corruptly accepting a consid-
eration as an inducement or reward for doing something in relation to a payor's affairs 




1 See United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978) (corrupt intent must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Barclay, 560 F.2d 812, 816-17 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (articulation of specific intent required in jury instructions); Baker v. United 
States, 310 F.2d 924, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1962) (jury may not infer specific intent from an 
isolated fact). 
102 SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Guide far 
International Operations Case L, reprinted in (1977] ANTI-TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) E-15 to E-16; McLaughlin, supra note 92, at 1105-09. 
103 SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 10. 
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can business any more than necessary to prevent corruption. This 
congressional purpose is exhibited by the distinction between 
ministerial and discretionary officials, the business purpose limi-
tation, and, most of all, the corruption requirement. The purpose 
of including the modifier "corruptly" was to limit application of 
the Act to cases only where the payor had "an intent to 
wrongfully influence" the official. 104 
If the payment is a normal, legal transaction in the setting 
where made, then it can be neither "wrongful" nor "corrupt." 
The purpose of this Act is to avoid antagonizing foreign govern-
ments, not to cripple American trade. Any uniform definition of 
"corruptly" would have the latter result, preventing Americans 
from trading on the basis of the local laws. 
A relative interpretation of "corruptly" will not lead to wide-
spread abuse, since the type of payments described by the FCPA 
are illegal in most other nations. 105 Furthermore, there will not be 
distortions of trade from illegal acts; all companies dealing with 
that nation would be on an equal footing. The American business 
community's reputation for honesty will not suffer since any ille-
gal payment would be outlawed in both the bribe-target nation 
'°' American courts must examine the bribe-target nation's laws to determine, as a 
matter of law, if the influence was "wrongful." Although condensing or generalizing the 
world's bribery and anti-corruption laws is beyond the scope of this note, some principles 
recur. 
Many common law nations require some valuable consideration to induce a decision. 
See, e.g., GHANA CRIMINAL CODE, Act 29 § 240 (1960). In French law a distinction is made 
between "passive corruption," (the payee requests the bribe) and "active corruption," 
(the payor initiates the transaction). Furthermore CODE PENAL Art. 175-1 (1960) provides 
that all public officials shall be subject to criminal sanctions for activities of a nature that 
compromise their independence in relation to those enterprises under their control, ad-
ministration, or service. Thus, a French public official commits corruption even if the act 
was beyond the scope of the employment of the official so long as the act was facilitated 
by his duties or position. See also CODE PENAL Art. 177 (1960). 
The Soviet Union prohibits the taking of a bribe, giving of a bribe, acting as an interme-
diary of a bribe, and bribery to obstruct a citizen's exercising the right to vote. Berman, 
Sov1ET CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURES, Articles 173, 174, 174-1, 189, 190, 132 (1972). In 
the Soviet Union taking a bribe is punishable by death. An act or omission to act is not a 
crime if, because of its insignificance, it does not represent a social danger. Id., at Art. 7. 
Other nations use different concepts and approaches for preventing corruption. Some 
of the world's bribery statutes include: Barbados, Art. 3, ~ 1 of the Prevention of Corrup-
tion and the Election Offenses and Controversies Act; Brazil, PENAL CODE Art. 317 (1969); 
Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 359, BORGERLJCHES GESETZBUCH (BGB) and "Rules of 
Behavior of Members of the German Bundestag," made effective Nov. 1, 197 (1976 Bun-
desgetszblatt I 2065-2066); India, Report of the Committee on the Prevention of Corrup-
tion, published by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Dell:ii, 1964; 
Japan, CRIMINAL STATUTES OF JAPAN, Arts, 197-198 (1968); Mexico, PENAL CODE Arts. 217, 
218 (1964); Sweden, BROTTSBALKEN (Penal Code) Ch. 20, secs. 1 and 2, (1972); and Tanza-
nia, Prevention of Corruption Ordinance Act 1970, No. 1. 
''" Abuses of Corporate Power, supra note 22, at 156 (statement of Chairman Prox-
mire); Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 18 (statement of Ralph Nader). 
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and the United States. 
One possible objection to a relative definition of "corruptly" 
may be made on due process grounds. A defendant may claim 
that the FCPA does not give adequate warning of the conduct 
proscribed. 108 This argument is unpersuasive for three reasons. 
First, the statute requires that the defendant must authorize the 
proscribed payments in order to be convicted. This factor alone 
provides fair warning. 187 Second, the defendant is not liable under 
the FCPA for any conduct proscribed by a foreign nation but not 
by the FCPA. Any ambiguities, such as the term "corruptly" 
should be strictly construed against the prosecution and in favor 
of the defendant. 188 This construction favors a relative definition 
for corruption. A defendant may have believed that "corruptly" 
referred to laws of the government being corrupted. In this situa-
tion, a uniform, domestically-oriented definition of "corruptly" 
could constitute a denial off air warning. Third, if a defendant has 
made a bribe in a foreign nation, he should be charged with 
knowledge of that nation's laws. 109 Therefore, the relative defini-
tion of "corruptly" not only provides due process, but it is desira-
ble in the interests of treating individual cases justly. 110 
1111 A situation analogous to the FCPA exists when Congress defines a federal crime by 
reference to a state statute. See, e.g., the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976) (upheld in 
United States v. Schwartz, 398 F.2d 464, 467 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969)), 
and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (upheld in United States v. 
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958)). In Sharpnack, the Court reasoned that since Congress 
had the power to adopt a uniform criminal code and since Congress could do so by copying 
from state legislation, Congress could assimilate state laws by reference. Id. at 293. 
107 There is no need for a person to guess at which conduct is proscribed under the 
FCPA; the conduct is clearly delineated. Any uncertainty which is involved goes to the 
level of intent required. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A) 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, 
violates the first essential of due process of law."); cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 
(1974) (a prohibition against treating the flag "contemptuously" held unconstitutionally 
vague). 
108 United States v. Chappell, 292 F. Supp. 494 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
iot Cf. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant does not 
need to know of foreign theft statute to know that the object was stolen). 
11
• A further objection to a relative definition of "corruptly" may be made on equal 
protection grounds. Since all defendants who are being tried under the FCPA are being 
tried under American law, it may be asserted that no distinction should be made because 
the payment occurred in Honduras rather than in Japan. 
This argument has been rejected by the courts in the context of state laws being relied 
upon to create federal liability. United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1093 (1st Cir.) 
cert. denied 429 U.S. 837 (1976); Turf Center, Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 793, 795-96 
(9th Cir. 1963); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871,890 (8th Cir. 1967) rev'd on other 
grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). There is no reason to believe that if reliance upon different 
state laws does not offend equal protection, differences among nations will so offend equal 
protection. "[E)qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classifica-
tion only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamen-
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E. Foreign Officials 
Both issuer and domestic concerns provisions of the FCPA 
specify that bribes are prohibited only when made to certain 
foreign government officials, foreign political parties, officials of 
foreign political parties or any other person while knowing, or 
having reason to know, that the compensation will be passed on 
to a foreign government official, political party or official of a 
party. 111 There is no reason to believe that the government influ-
enced must be the official's own government. The FCPA's defini-
tion of a foreign government official112 specifically excludes any-
one whose duties are "essentially ministerial or clerical." Thus, 
bribes made as "grease money" to expedite a bureaucratic, cleri-
cal activity are legal, 113 while bribing a person with discretionary 
powers is illegal, even if the action paid for is essentially minis-
terial. 
This distinction was a major source of concern throughout the 
hearings, since prohibiting all payments would unnecessarily 
cripple American commercial activities abroad.'" Expediting or 
"grease" payments are made to insure promptness or reliability 
in the foreign official's job performance and would include such 
diverse payments as expediting shipments, placing a transo-
ceanic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining 
adequate police protection. 115 There is no dollar limitation on 
grease money .116 
tal right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. 
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). Bribery is not a fundamental right, nor do payors constitute a 
suspect class. 
Even if a court recognized a relative definition as a purely judge-made classification, 
the classification would not violate equal protection. Discrimination in enforcement of a 
statute is not invidious unless deliberately based upon an unjustifiable classification, such 
as race or religion. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 102, 104 (D. Kan. 1971). 
111 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a)(Supp. I 1977). 
"' Section 103(a) defines "foreign official" as 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or 
instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on 
behalf of such government or department, agency or instrumentality. Such term 
does not include any employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or 
clerical. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977) (emphasis added). 
113 SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 10. 
'" See 123 CONG. REC. H12825-26 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977). 
'" SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 10. 
'" But see 347 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 7 (8/21/78). The Federal Trade Commission 
has placed a $1,000 limit on payments which can be made by the Lockheed Corp. This 
limit appears to define the F.T.C.'s toleration of grease money payments. 
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The distinction between ministerial and discretionary officials 
is vague. Since no reliable definition is provided by either the 
FCPA or its legislative history, presumably the accepted Ameri-
can definitions should apply. 117·A ministerial officer is an official 
who has no power to pass judgment on the matter to be done, and 
usually must obey a superior. 118 Whether one is a ministerial offi-
cer depends on the general nature and scope of his duties and not 
whether a particular act involves judgment or discretion. 119 If the 
officer is expected to ascertain facts, but upon ascertaining the 
facts has an absolute, imperative duty, his work is ministerial. 120 
Discretionary duties require the exercise of reason in the adapta-
tion of means to an end, and a choice in determining the course 
to be pursued. 
A foreign official is defined in the FCPA as an official employed 
by a foreign government, department, agency or instrumentality. 
No distinction is made between foreign officials engaged in pro-
prietary functions and those performing governmental functions. 
While general commercial bribery is not covered by the Act, brib-
ing a foreign official of a state industry or enterprise is covered. 121 
An "agency or instrumentality" is not defined by the FCPA, but 
a convenient definition is found in the Foreign Sovereign Immun-
ities Act. 122 This definition includes state-run enterprises. 
The FCPA forbids payments to foreign political parties and 
candidates for public office which are made with the intention of 
influencing a governmental decision by that person. 123 The pay-
117 The domestic bribery laws (18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)) do not make an equivalent 
distinction; rather the distinctions are linked to the level of criminal intent. See United 
States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
"' 63 AM. JuR. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 28 (1972). 
m Id.; See People v. Fowler, 14 Ill. 2d 252, 260 (1958); People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 
606 (1942) (parole board as an "administrative" body); People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. 124, 92 
N.E. 607 (1910). 
'"' 63 AM. JuR. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 273 (1972). 
m 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. I 1977) ("instrumentality"). 
,n An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(!) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state 
or political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country. 
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1978). 
Congress created this definition in 1976 to classify which foreign entities are a part of a 
foreign government and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) at 15, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604, 
6614. Since the FCPA is also concerned with determining which entities are a part of a 
foreign government, this definition should be applied. 
123 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(l)(B), (2)(B), (3)(B), 78dd-2(a) (l)(B), (2)(B), (3)(B) (Supp. 
I 1977). 
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ments, however, must have a business purpose to be proscribed. 124 
A political contribution made by an issuer or a connected person 
which is not intended to influence the official in obtaining or 
retaining business with that issuer is not proscribed. 125 
The ban on political contributions could be challenged as an 
unconstitutional limitation upon the corporation's First Amend-
ment rights. However, because the FCPA prohibits only corpo-
rate contributions made for corrupt purposes, the Act will proba-
bly survive such an attack. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act 126 
prohibiting corporate political contributions to individuals or 
parties has been upheld, partly because the overriding concern 
behind that act's passage was the need to suppress corruption, a 
legitimate legislative goal. 127 The corruption requirement distin-
guishes the FCPA from the Massachusetts statute128 struck down 
in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 129 which prohibited corporate 
contributions or expenditures in public referenda as well as in 
partisan elections. The Supreme Court, in Bellotti, found that 
a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public 
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different 
context of participation in a political campaign for elec-
tion to public office. Congress might well be able to dem-
onstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent cor-
ruption in independent expenditure, by corporations to 
influence candidate elections. 130 
The FCP A does not infringe on the right of a corporation to adver-
tise or expend money with regard to political elections, except 
that they may not be made to partisan groups in order to secure 
business advantages from that group. The FCPA should with-
stand any constitutional challenge on these grounds. 131 
"' See notes 136-39 and accompanying text infra. 
,,. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a)(Supp. I 1977). 
,.. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (Supp. I 1977). 
127 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n. 26 (1978); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-75 
(1957). 
, .. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law Co-op 1978). 
, .. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
130 Id. at 788 n. 26. 
131 In an analogous situation, the military may restrict the First Amendment rights of 
American servicemen abroad. This is in part due to the special role as political representa-
tive that the military plays while stationed abroad. The United States government may 
limit the political activities of servicemen both here and abroad. Culver v. Secretary of 
the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733, 758-59 (1974). American-based multinational corporations also have political charac-
teristics in their international dealings which may support a congressional policy of limit-
ing their involvement in foreign politics. 
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The FCPA deals particularly with corporate payments to a 
foreign local agent with the understanding that the agent will 
pass on part of the fee to government officials. 132 All that is re-
quired is that the payor know or have reason to know that all or 
a portion of the payment will flow either directly or indirectly to 
one of the forbidden parties or officials. 133 The defendant must 
have passed the money to an agent with the corrupt purpose of 
having that money distributed to one of the forbidden officials. 134 
The phrase "having reason to know," when read in conjunction 
with "corruptly" should be interpreted as meaning that the agent 
need not explicitly inform the defendant that the money would 
be passed on, so long as the defendant understood or expected 
that the agent would do so. 135 The phrase thereby prevents a 
payor from escaping liability by not explicity instructing the 
agent that a bribe was to be paid. 
F. The Business Purpose Limitation 
The Senate bill placed a final limitation in both the issuer and 
domestic concerns sections requiring that the motive behind the 
forbidden activities be to "assist such issuer in obtaining or re-
taining business for or with, or directing business to, any person, 
or influencing legislation or regulations of that government or 
instrumentailty. " 136 
The final Act, however, forbids only those payments made in 
order to assist an issuer in obtaining or retaining business, for or 
with, or directing business to, any person. This was a significant 
change from the limitations in the Senate bill, "directing busi-
ness or influencing legislation," and from the equivalent provi-
sion in the House bill, "to affect or influence any act or decision 
of such government or instrumentality." 137 
,.. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. I 1977); SENATE REPORT, supra note 
10, at 10. 
133 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. I 1977). The "having reason to know" 
standard could conceivably create a violation of due process, since the standard of "had 
reason to know" is unusually loose for criminal liability. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964). Unquestionably, the circumstances surrounding the payment 
will be decisive. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
'" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. I 1977). 
133 But see Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944); United States v. Blaint, 
258 U.S. 250 (1922) (punishment of a crime when person was ignorant of the facts making 
the act a crime does not violate due process). 
131 123 CONG. REc. S7198 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (emphasis added); SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 10. 
"' 123 CONG. REC. S7198 (daily ed. May 5, 1977), Hll,932 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977). The 
Conference Report states that S. 305 also prohibited "divert[ing] a business opportunity 
from any person," but such language was not in S. 305, unless by implication. See 
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A mere change in the foreign nation's laws is not sufficient to 
show a violation of the FCPA; the change must also affect a 
person's (not necessarily the issuer's) business standing. 138 While 
the phrase "obtaining or retaining business" would cover a con-
tract between the payor and the bribe-target nation, or payments 
of protection money to allow continued commerce, it would not· 
cover other important situations. Incredibly, this section fails to 
encompass a traditional and widespread type of bribery: the 
buying of favorable regulation or legislation. 139 The reason for this 
omission is unclear; the Conference Report gives no indication of 
congressional intent. The only explanation for the omission is 
that Congress wished to avoid any infringement on American 
activities which did not relate to obtaining business. 
G. Enforcement Responsibilities 
The legislative history of the FCPA envisioned that the SEC 
would continue in its role as investigator of foreign bribes. 140 The 
SEC has two available remedies: civil injunction141 and suspen-
sion of an attorney's or accountant's right to practice before the 
SEC. 142 The Justice Department will prosecute any criminal vio-
lations. 143 Once the SEC has compiled enough evidence for a 
criminal action, the case shall be ref erred to the Justice Depart-
ment for criminal prosecution. 144 
One word of caution must be voiced to the attorney already 
familiar with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the general 
securities disclosure scheme. The FCPA does not rectify any ex-
isting inadequacies in the disclosure scheme. The FCPA may 
punish a miscreant corporation yet still not provide helpful infor-
mation _to the investors of that corporation·. 145 The traditional 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12. The exclusion of this clause from the final Act 
should not be taken as a clear signal that Congress did not want to extend coverage to 
include bribes involved in unfair trading practices, but the fact that the conferees consid-
ered and disregarded such language does imply that they are not prohibited. 
138 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. I 1977). 
131 The FCPA does not proscribe bribes such as were paid by United Brands in Hondu-
ras for tax advantages. See note 17 supra. 
'" SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. 
"' SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 12; see also Paige Airways, Inc., No. 78-0656 
~ 96,393; SEC v. Int'! Systems Control Corp., [1979) 838 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7-8 
(D.D.C. Dec. 27, 1979). 
'" SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 12; 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1979). 
'" The Justice Department will review corporations on a case-by-case basis to deter-
mine if prosecution is warranted. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.17, reprinted in 522 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) J-1 (Oct. 3, 1979). See also note 175 infra for a discussion of criminal penalties. 
'" SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-12. 
145 Revealed information could lead to a conviction under the FCPA which may result 
in a million dollar fine for the corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. I 1977). The corpora-
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congressional policy of protecting investors through disclosure is 
unaided by the criminalization of these payments. The FCPA 
may aid investors by deterring some illegal corporate payments, 
but this could have been achieved equally well by including the 
FCPA within the domestic bribery statute. 148 The accounting pro-
visions which purport to be the enforcement mechanism under 
the Act do not require any new disclosure,147 These provisions 
merely require a standard of tight management control of corpo-
rate expenditures. Internal controls in the form of recordation and 
authorization standards were included in the FCPA under the 
rubric of improving disclosure, yet a failure to disclose material 
information is a violation of the Securities Exchange Act even 
without strong management control. 
Congress enacted mandatory minimum accounting standards 
under the guise of enforcing the criminalization provisions. 148 
These standards codify generally accepted auditing practices 
tion's business prospects in the country which was bribed would be jeopardized. Few, if 
any, investors would desire such a punishment, no matter how rampant their corporation's 
corruption. 
"' The domestic bribery statute is the Corrupt Practices Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
201 (1978). 
'" The illegality of a payment alone does not make that payment "material" and thus 
subject to disclosure pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act. See notes 159-67 a~d 
accompanying text infra. 
'" "The purpose of [the accounting provisions] is to strengthen the accuracy of the 
corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process which constitutes the 
foundations of our system of corporate disclosure." SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7. 
The accounting provisions "are intended to operate in tandem with the criminalization 
provisions ... to deter corporate bribery." Id. These accounting standards are to, 
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific 
authorization; 
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to permit preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (2) to maintain accountability 
for assets; 
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general 
or specific authorization; and 
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at 
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differ-
ences. 
15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. I 1977). See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 242 (Feb. 
16, 1978), reprinted in 14 SEC Docket 180 (Feb. 28, 1978). 
The tangential relationship of the accounting standards and the rest of the FCPA is 
indicated in the SEC's new rules adopted pursuant to the accounting standards, Regula-
tion 13B-2, "Maintenance of Records and Preparation of Required Reports," 44 Fed. Reg. 
10,964 (1979), (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 
13B-2]. The SEC admits that these rules are "intended to deal with a much broader range 
of practices than the problem of questionable payments .... " Id. 
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advocated by the SEC149 and the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. 150 The essence of the four standards is that 
expenditures be made only with the management's approval, and 
that they be properly recorded. Congress felt that these standards 
"will go a long way to prevent the use of corporate assets for 
corrupt purposes ... [and that] public confidence in securities 
markets will be enhanced by assurance that corporate record 
keeping is honest. " 151 
The goal of these provisions is corporate accountability. 152 The 
mandatory minimum standards cover the same securities issuers 
as does the securities issuer section153-those who are required to 
register pursuant to section 12 and those who are required to file 
reports pursuant to section 15(d)154 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The SEC asserts that the accounting standards and an 
SEC regulation 155 are designed to help implement the basic goals 
of the 1934 Act, though, as previously discussed, this article disa-
grees with the SEC's assertion. To be sure, the disclosure regime 
is threatened by the use of slush funds and off-the-books transac-
tions. 158 Unfortunately, the goal of disclosure is not supported by 
making the payments illegal. 157 While many firms will be less 
likely to pass bribes in the future, those which do will avoid using 
regular corporate channels so as to evade the auditor. Therefore, 
"' SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (Jan. 19, 1977), reprinted in [1976-77] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) if 80,896. 
1
'° The Act attempts to codify existing concepts and practices advocated by many 
accountants. The wording of the Act is taken in part from § 320.28 of the Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 2, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures. SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 8. See Cook & Kelly, Internal Accounting Control: A Matter of 
Law, 147 J. AccoUNTANCY 58 (Jan. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Cook & Kelly]. See also 
Atheson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; An International Application of 
SEC's Corporate Governance Programs, 13 INT'L LAW. 703 (Fall 1978). 
151 SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7. 
152 Regulation i3B-2, supra note 148, 44 Fed. Reg. at 10,966. 
153 See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra. 
1
" 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1978). 
153 Regulation 13B-2, supra note 148, 44 Fed. Reg. at 10,966. The SEC claims that the 
"goal of corporate accountability" is common to the FCPA and the Exchange Act. 
1
" Regulation 13B-2, supra note 148, 44 Fed. Reg. at 10,964-65. 
157 Some corporations may have found ways to avoid the FCPA by creating foreign 
subsidiaries to make payments. Any United States citizens involved in the creation of a 
foreign subsidiary for this purpose are probably guilty of acts done "in furtherance or• the 
payment. See Activities of American Multi-National Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, 
at 36 (statement of SEC Commissioner Phillip Loomis). 
Professor Barry Richman believes payments are still being made and hidden. "Some 
companies have hidden the payments so well they haven't even been disclosed ... Others 
are still making payments, but they've become more sophisticated. They are simply 
changing distribution channels and using third parties to make the payments, so that their 
own books are clean." Rankin, Accounting Ruses Used in Disguising Dubious Payments, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1978, § D (Business/Finance), at 1, col. 1. 
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the accounting provisions by themselves by no means deter brib-
ery. 
The accounting provisions may, however, signal a new "control 
environment" which already has led to codes of employee conduct 
and the establishment of independent auditing boards. 158 While 
the accounting provisions may aid corporate responsibility, the 
provisions are very different in nature from the Exchange Act's 
disclosure scheme. The accounting standards do not require any 
disclosure. The standard of disclosure under the Exchange Act is 
"materiality."159 The accounting provisions of the FCPA do not 
affect what is "material," nor do they use a materiality standard 
for recordation, although the legislative history of the accounting 
standards indicates that a truly insignificant transaction may be 
omitted from recordation. 160 
Through regulations, the SEC has gone far beyond the statu-
tory authority of the FCPA's accounting standards and has man-
dated that, "no person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause 
to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to the account-
ing standards."161 This provision contains no "materiality" stan-
'" FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 820 at 7-8 (Aug. 22, 1979); 486 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) D-2 (Jan. 17, 1979); 473 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-6 (Nov. 11, 1978) (state-
ments of SEC Chairman Williams); 487 SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-17 (Jan. 24, 1979) (state-
ment of Treasury General Counsel Robert Mundheim). Cf. A. CONARD, supra note 7, at 
355-76. 
"' A. CONARD, supra note 7, at 303. Professor Conard defines "materiality" as a quality 
of information which would be "likely to affect the investment decision of the investor." 
Id. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 
1947). 
180 The Senate Report suggests that corporate management, in designing systems under 
the accounting standards, should take into consideration the "cost/benefit relationship of 
the steps to be taken in fulfillment of its responsibilities .... "SENATE REPORT, supra note 
10, at 8. 
S. 305 required the issuer to "devise and maintain adequate systems of internal account-
ing controls" which would be sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions 
would be recorded to maintain accountability of assets. Since the precise requirements of 
the system of internal controls to be maintained by the issuer are set forth in specific terms 
in the statute, the word "adequate" was deemed superfluous and deleted in conference. 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 10. 
111 Regulation 13B-2, Rule 13b2-l, supra note 148. The CONFERENCE REPORT, however, 
makes clear that, "the conferees intend that no inference should be drawn with respect 
to any rule-making authority the SEC may or may not have under the securities laws," 
due to the deletion of language which would have supported Rule 13b2-1. CONFERENCE 
REPORT, supra note 33, at 11. 
In explaining the decision to delete these provisions from the Act, Senator Proxmire 
stated that 
These provision is [sic] prohibited any person from 'knowingly' lying to an 
accountant in connection with an audit of the firm. Unfortunately these provi-
sions became involved in an issue never intended to be raised or resolved by the 
Senate bill - namely, whether or not the inclusion or deletion of the work 
'knowingly' would or would not affirm expand or overrule the decision of the 
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dard, nor does it impose the requirement of scienter for a viola-
tion.182 In one of its rules the SEC has prohibited any officer or 
director from misleading an accountant, and although immater-
ial transgressions are exempted, scienter again is not required. 183 
These rules were adopted over the objections of one Commis-
sioner, 184 and were subject to substantial criticism when they were 
proposed.185 
An auditor who suspects or has discovered a bribe or other 
weakness in an issuer's internal accounting controls should, in 
considering disclosure, act in accordance with his current profes-
sional standards. 188 Although an illegal act is not necessarily ma-
terial, and thereby subject to disclosure, illegal payments may 
reflect on management's integrity with the result that failure to 
disclose these payments is a material omission. This view has 
been criticized on the ground that the securities laws are intended 
to protect investors, not society at large. 187 According to one com-
mentator, savvy lawyers should not give opinions on compliance 
with the accounting provisions; whether a payment is material is 
a factual question for the auditor rather than a legal conclusion.188 
Finally, the accounting standards section of the FCPA contains 
provisions which allow the head of any agency or department 
responsible for national security matters to exempt, on a limited 
basis, an issuer involved in an enterprise related to national secu-
rity.189 For any exemption, directives must be executed with spe-
cificity, must expire annually unless renewed in writing, and be 
Supreme Court in the Hochfelder case [Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 325 U.S. 
185 (1976) ] .... This legislation is not the forum to debate Hochfelder issues. 
This is legislation to proscribe foreign corporate bribery. 
123 CoNG. REC. Sl9,399 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977). 
'" 44 Fed. Reg. 10,967-68. 
113 Id. at 10,969-70. 
'" Id. at 10,970 (statement of former SEC Commissioner Karmel). 
'" Id. at 10,968-69. 
'" While no authoritative work has been completed to guide accountants in complying 
with the accounting standards, a special advisory committee of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants has issued a tentative report giving guidelines for evaluating 
internal accounting control. This report was issued in Cook & Kelly, supra note 150. See 
also AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 16, The Independent Auditor's 
Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (Jan. 1977), codified in AICPA, 
Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 150, § 327; SAS 17, Illegal Acts by Clients 
(Jan. 1977), codified in AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 150, § 328; 
SAS 20, Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control 
(Aug. 1977), codified in AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards, supra note 150, § 323. 
'" 476 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12 (Nov. 1, 1978) (statement of former SEC 
Commissioner Karmel). 
"" 487 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-18 (Jan. 24, 1979) (statement of former SEC 
Commissioner A. A. Sommer Jr.). 
11
• 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
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reviewed annually by the President. 170 The President must certify 
that such directives involve classified information and conform 
with applicable statutes and Executive Orders. 171 Furthermore, 
the section requires that a summary of all such directives be 
submitted annually to the appropriate congressional intelligence 
oversight committees. 172 The only matters to be excluded from the 
recordation requirements of the preceding paragraphs are those 
which would result or would be likely to result in the disclosure 
of information which has been classified in the interests of na-
tional security.'73 Even then, they may only be excluded to the 
extent that such information is specifically related to the person's 
lawful cooperation. 174 Due to these stringent requirements, this 
national security provision is unlikely to become a loophole for 
evasion of the Act. 
H. Criminal and Civil Penalties Under the Securities Issuer and 
Domestic Concerns Sections 175 
In determining the penalty to be applied in any given case, it 
has been argued here that the court should examine the laws of 
the nation which is affected by the bribe. 178 If that nation's laws,. 
customs, or mores permit payments, the social harm created by 
the payment is minimal and the punishment should reflect this 
fact. . 
The House Report accompanying the House bill specified that 
a private cause of action might be allowed under the Act for those 
who are injured by the bribe or its effects, 177 but the Conference 
Report made no mention of this issue. 178 The FCPA does not 
specifically mention a private action, but such an action would 
"' Id. 
171 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 11; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(A) (Supp. I 1977). 
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(B)(Supp. I 1977). 
173 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 11. 
"' Id. 
175 The securities issuer provision provides that where an issuer has been found to violate 
the section, any employee or agent (other than an officer, director or stockholder) who is 
subject to United States jurisdiction and who willfully carried out the act constituting the 
violation shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, 
or both. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (c)(3)(Supp. I 1977). Since the employee or agent has less control 
over the issuer, his liability should be predicated on the issuer's. 123 CONG. REC. Hll,934 
(daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977). The issuer is forbidden from directly or indirectly reimbursing 
the convicted person. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
171 Even if the courts prove unwilling to examine the laws of the bribe-target nation to 
determine if the payment was made corruptly, the court should punish bribes given in 
violation of the target nation's laws more severely than payments made p1,1rsuant to local 
custom and law. 
177 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 55, at 10. 
"' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33. 
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unquestionably benefit enforcement and should be allowed. 179 
One other significant variation between the issuer section and 
the domestic concerns section is that the latter authorizes the 
Attorney General to obtain permanent or temporary civil injunc-
tions to prevent violations of the section. •so The Attorney General 
must have some reason to believe that a person or company cov-
ered by the section is engaged in, or at least is about to engage 
in, a violation. •st The standard of proof necessary to obtain the 
injunction is uncertain; only a "proper" showing is required by 
the section. 182 
III. INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE FCPA 
One of the major problems with the FCPA is that it affects only 
American-based corporations and cannot affect foreign-based 
"' See Letter from Frederick B. Wade (SEC Special Counsel, Office of the General 
Counsel) (asserting the existence of a private cause of action), reprinted in (1978 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,701. The House clearly intended that a private 
cause of action should exist. HousE REPORT, supra note 55, at 10. The Senate deliberately 
refrained from taking a position on this issue. 123 CONG. REC. S19,401 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 
1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower). 
The Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-85 (1975), enunciated four factors 
to be used by the federal courts in assessing whether a private cause of action may be 
implied in a federal statute. First, whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose 
special benefit the statute was enacted; second, whether there is an indication of legisla-
tive intent to allow such a cause of action; third, whether it is consistent with the underly-
ing purposes of the legislature to imply such a right; finally, whether the cause of action 
is one which is normally left to state law. 
Under these criteria the FCPA should include an implied right of action. Any share-
holder, bondholder or competitor injured by a'bribe is a member of the class for whose 
protection Congress enacted the FCPA. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-4; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5; 123 CONG. REC. HU, 932 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977). See also 
notes 23-25 & 156 and accompanying text supra. The House certainly intended that such 
a right of action should exist. HousE REPORT, supra note 55, at 10. The Senate did not 
oppose it, though it did not explicitly support an action. 123 CoNG. REC. S19,401 (1977). 
The enforcement of the Act would be improved through actions by "private attorneys-
general," who would bear part of the burden of enforcement for the Justice Department. 
Finally, no state cause of action exists to allow redress from a violation of the FCPA. 
Therefore, a private cause of action is a constructive method of enforcing the Act and so 
should be allowed by the courts. See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1963) (first 
recognition by Supreme Court of an implied right of action under the securities laws); 466 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-7 (Aug., 16, 1978). 
''° 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (Supp. I 1977). 
181 Id. 
182 The critical question as to the propriety of the injunction is whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood of future violations. Among the factors relevant to determining such 
likelihood are: (1) the existence and nature of the past violations, (2) whether defendants 
admit past guilt or maintain their past conduct was blameless, (3) whether the defendants 
ceased their actions voluntarily or only upon the filing of a complaint, and (4) the sincerity 
of defendants' assurances that they will not violate the FCPA in the future. SEC v. 
Pennsylvania Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 596-97 (E.D. Penn. 1976) (injunctions sought 
by SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u). See also SEC 
v. Int'! Systems Control Corp., (1979] 838 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7-8 (injunction 
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enterprises. Since American corporations must compete against 
foreign corporations for sales to third parties, unless action is 
taken on a multinational basis, these foreign competitors have an 
advantage when dealing with foreign governments. 183 During the 
congressional hearings, the need for a multinational ban was 
often discussed 184 and the State Department assured Congress 
that an effective international treaty would be pursued. 185 This 
promise has been pursued but has not yet been effectuated. 
A. Interest Affected by the FCPA and a Multilateral Treaty 
There are five major types of parties affected by United States 
legislation prohibiting foreign bribery. An examination of these 
parties and their interests shows that multinational action, al-
though difficult to achieve, is nevertheless necessary to improve 
American trade. 
The first and most obvious party is an American corporation 
with operations abroad. The corporation has an interest in max-
imizing profits, and its ability to do so will be hampered by the 
FCPA. Although rumors of corporations going out of business or 
losing significant sales due to the FCPA have been more anecdo-
tal than significant, the situation: may change.186 On the other 
hand, the existence of the FCPA leaves the American corporation 
less open to blackmail and threats of extortion, since such pay-
ments are subject to disclosure. While FCPA may also make 
American firms more welcome in nations which are concerned 
about controlling corruption, American firms should favor an in-
ternational treaty which would effectively place all companies on 
granted under FCPA) (D.D.C., Dec. 27, 1979). 
183 The competitive effects of the FCPA are still difficult to access. Lockheed, once a 
major payor, agreed under heavy pressure from the United States government (prior to 
passage of the FCPA) not to pay any more bribes. Lockheed claims that as a result it lost 
a jumbo-jet contract for India to a French competitor that had contributed $1.5 million 
to the then-ruling Congress Party. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade 
Abroad, supra note 22, at 11, 61. 
,.. The need for a multinational ban was supported by Charles W. Robinson, then 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs: "Unilateral action alone cannot be an 
adequate solution to an international problem. Effective international cooperation is the 
only real answer." Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 98. Then-Secretary of 
Commerce, Elliot Richardson, echoed these attitudes in his appearance before the same 
committee: "Whatever may be done unilaterally, there is a clear need for a multilateral 
approach also, given the effort to achieve greater consistency and enforcement world-
wide." Id. at 104. Chairman Proxmire and Secretary Richardson agreed, however, that 
some action by the United States was necessary before significant actions could be taken 
abroad. See also Remarks of Senator Ribicoff, 121 CONG. REC. S36,093 (1975). 
, .. Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 156 (Statement of Deputy Secretary 
of State Robert Ingersoll). 
,,. See Ulmer, Southeast Asia: Doing Business in the Third World, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Dec. 1978, at 6. 
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an equal footing. 
The second interested party is a multinational corporation 
based outside the United States. Such a corporation is generally 
free to make payments in the absence of any specific domestic or 
international restrictions. Presumably, foreign corporations con-
tinue to make these payments. Since the revelations have thus far 
concerned mainly American firms, there exists no significant 
public pressure on foreign corporations to stop payments. More-
over, the passage of the FCPA may have given a foreign corpo-
ration a competitive advantage over American corporations, 
solely because of the latter's inability to make proscribed pay-
ments. Unless a multinational treaty which is enforceable under 
the domestic law of the firm's headquarters is created, it will 
continue past practices. 187 Not surprisingly, therefore, foreign 
multinational firms would probably oppose any treaty which 
limits their actions. 
The bribe-target nation is another affected party. In many na-
tions there is great concern over the corruption engendered by the 
presence of corporations willing and able to pay millions of dollars 
in bribes. 188 These nations should support a multinational treaty. 
Yet other similarly situated nations have expressed little or no 
concern over bribery because of the traditional acceptance of such 
payments and the lack of public awareness. In many of the latter 
nations, the officials believe they have a right to collect payments 
as gratuities for representing the corporation to their govern-
ment.189 They compare their role to American lobbyists or law-
yers. These government officials resent any action to limit this 
income source and so may be expected to oppose any treaty which 
would do so. 
A fourth interested party is an industrialized foreign nation, 
e.g., West Germany, Japan and France, whose corporations com-
pete with American firms for sales. These nations have little in-
centive, apart from moral concerns, to penalize bribes made 
"' See Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 18, at 49, 62 (Statements of George 
Ball and Ian MacGregor). 
'" Prior to the Islamic revolution, Iran took measures to control corruption. See Protect-
ing the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad, supra note 22, at 13; IRANIAN PENAL 
.CODE ARTS. 139, 143, 147 (1978), discussed in U.N.E.S.C. Doc. E/5838, supra note 94. The 
efforts of the Shah were insufficient to stem corruption and were heavily criticized. 
'" See Agent's Fees in the Middle East, a memorandum approved and circulated by 
the Defense Security Assistance Agency, reprinted in Activities of American Multina-
tional Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, at 100-02. 
In India, for example, public servants are paid very little and are expected to supple-
ment their income with gratuities. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade 
Abroad, supra note 22, at 20; Gwirtzman, supra note 17, at 101, col. 4. 
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abroad. 190 Unlike the United States, they do not see themselves 
as engaged in an ideological struggle and the actions of their firms 
do not reflect upon the broader East-West conflict. Their corpora-. 
tions have not, thus far, been involved in many public scandals 
relating to foreign bribery. Three of these competing nations, 
Japan, Holland, and Italy, however, have themselves been bribe-
targets. An awareness of bribery's effects may motivate these 
nations to act. Pressure from the United States may influence 
other industrialized nations. Unless these nations feel some pres-
sure, internal or external, they will not help to create an effective 
treaty. 
The final party is the United States government, whose inter-
ests lie both in conducting foreign policy and in promoting foreign 
trade. The American government's interests reflect the congres-
sional objectives in passing the FCPA. 191 While the FCPA furthers 
these interests, its unilateral prohibitions create an incentive to 
obtain a multilateral ban. President Carter has expressed dismay 
over the difficulties the United States has experienced in its at-
tempts to create a multilateral treaty through the United Na-
tions. He blamed the other developed nations for their lack of 
interest and for their opposition to uniform disclosure rules relat-
ing to bribe payments. Developing countries have also given scant 
support for a multinational treaty and have sought to link the 
payments problem to the creation of a general code of conduct for 
multinational enterprises. 192 
The optimal solution to the situation is a multinational treaty, 
executed simultaneously by all industrial, capital-exporting na-
tions, banning bribery. The State Department is still pressing for . 
such a treaty to unify multinational business practices193 and to 
prevent illicit payments. 194 
11
• West Germany has taken the position that although allowing German companies to 
deduct foreign bribes on their tax returns is morally indefensible if its laws were changed 
its firms would be unable to compete. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade 
Abroad, supra note 22, at 19. The French have increased their share of the world's arms 
sales by institutionalizing the payment of commissions through the French Defense Minis-
try. This has earned that Ministry the nickname "LeMinistere des Pots-de-Vin" 
("Ministry of Bribes"). The Sunday Telegraph (London), Sept. 7, 1975, reprinted in 
Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 4, at 354. 
111 See notes 20-29 and accompanying text supra. 
112 President Jimmy Carter, (1977] U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE U.N. 124 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as U.S. PARTICIPATION]. 
'" The United Nations is preparing a Code of Conduct for Multinational Corporations. 
See 61 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5), U.N. Doc. E/5782 (1976); CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, Transnational Corporations; Material Relevant to the F,ormulation of a 
Code of Conduct. U.N. ESCOR Doc. E/Cl0/18 (1977); CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPO-
RATIONS, International Standards of Accounting and Reporting for Transnational 
Corporations, U.N. ESCOR Doc. No. ST/CTC/5 (1977). 
,,. While the FCPA was in committee, the Senate passed Resolution 265, instructing 
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B. Efforts by the United Nations 
The State Department's major effort for a multinational treaty 
has been in the United Nations. Beginning in 1975, the United 
States has been active in the United Nations Commission on 
Transnational Corporations, which produced a "Draft Interna-
tional Agreement to Prevent and Eliminate Illicit Payments in 
International Commercial Transactions."195 Hopefully, an agree-
ment will be signed by "Contracting States," who thereby agree 
to create a domestic law which is essentially equivalent to the 
FCPA. 198 
The inclusion of Article 7, prohibiting economic ties with South 
Africa, 197 is still under debate in the Working Group, 198 and fur-
ther discussion will delay the Agreement's consummation. The 
United States should follow the General Assembly resolutions 
referred to in Article 7 and allow its inclusion. 199 Economic ties 
with an admittedly racist regime should not be allowed to frus-
trate an agreement of this importance.200 Moreover, the inclusion 
of Article 7 will encourage many nations to support the agree-
ment, and if any nation, including the United States, objects, 
United States negotiators at the Geneva Round of Trade Negotiations (G.A.T.T.) and in 
any other international forum to press for the creation of an international code of conduct 
to ban bribery. See also § 121 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2131· (1976). 
11
• Rep. of the Comm. on an Int 'I Agreement on Illicit Payments on its First and Second 
Sessions, 65 U.N. ESCOR Doc. No. E/1979/104 (Agenda Item 9) (1979), reprinted in 18 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1025 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft Agreement]. 
"' Id. at 1026. The Draft would ban both the offering of a payment to an official in 
return for a government favor in an "international commercial transaction" and the 
soliciting of such a payment by a government official. Art. l(a), (b). The Draft does not 
cover extortion situations. The Working Group declined explicitly to prohibit extortion or 
passive bribery, though an inclusion was discussed. Comments on the Draft Agreement, 
Id. at 15. The Draft does not use the concept of corruption. Articles 3-6, and 8-14 are 
supportive of the enforcement of Article 1. Draft Agreement, supra note 195, reprinted in 
18 lNT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1025, 1027-28, 1029-40 (1979). 
117 Article 7 requires each contracting State to prohibit its citizens from making "any 
royalty or tax payment to, or from knowingly transferring any assets or any other financial 
resources in contravention of United Nations resolutions to facilitate trade with, or invest-
ment in a territory occupied by an illegal minority regime in southern Africa." Draft 
Agreement, supra note 195, Art. 7(1). See also COMMISSION ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, Report on the Fourth Session 64 U.N. ESCOR Doc. No. E/1978/52, Supp. 
(No. 12) 19 (1978). 
11
• "Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices" 
which created the Draft pursuant to ESCOR Res. 2041, 61 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) 
17, U.N. Doc. No. E/5889 (1976). 
'" See generally Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, 33 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 22), U.N. Doc. No. N33/22 (1978); G.A. Res. 31/6 A-K, 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 39) 10-16, Annex, U.N. Doc. No. N31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 3411, 30 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 34) 36-39, U.N. Doc. No. N10034 (1975). 
zoo The South African issue has led to a protracted dispute over its inclusion in the 
Draft. See U.S. PARTICIPATION, supra note 192, at 124. 
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that nation may enter reservations as to any two of the articles. 201 
Only Article 7 is outside the scope of the FCPA. 
Although the Draft is encouraging, it will be many years before 
an effective ban is achieved. The agreement must be completed202 
and signed, effective domestic laws must be passed, and, in some 
nations, enforcement mechanisms must be created before illicit 
payments are universally halted. Thus, there is little hope for 
multinational implementation before the late 1980's. 
C. Efforts by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) 
One major effort toward international cooperation has been 
completed through the OECD.203 The OECD's Declaration on In-
ternational Investment and Multinational Enterprises, adopted 
on June 21, 1976, 204 specifies that illegal bribes and improper 
201 Reservations may not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Agreement. 
Report of the Economic and Social Council Comm. on An lnt'l Agreement on Illicit 
Payments, 65 U.N. ESCOR Doc. No. E/1979/104 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1025, 1039 (1979). Article 7 is not an integral part of this Agreement, and a 
reservation of this Article should not be considered incompatible. 
202 The progress of the Draft Agreement has been disappointing. The President had 
predicted that the Agreement would be presented to the U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil in mid-1977. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, [1976] U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE U.N., 156 
(1977). In mid-1978 the Draft was presented, and the Council created a committee of all 
interested states to discuss the Draft, delaying possibilities of early enactment. Report of 
the Economic and Social Council, 33 U.N. GAOR Doc. No. A/33/3, Supp. (No. 3) 59-60 
(1978). Overriding a recommendation of the Working Group, the U.N. Economic and 
Social Council has called for a conference of pleni-potentiaries open to all interested states 
to conclude a final agreement. Id. at 59. This conference may convene in 1980, if a 
necessary quorum can be gathered. Economic and Social Council Decision 1978n1. 64 
U.N. ESCOR Doc. No. E/1978n8, Supp. (No. 1) (1979). This is an unnecessary delay; 
forty-five nations participated in the Working Group and these included all the Western 
industrial nations. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REP., April 1978, at 7. 
The United States should prevent further controversy concerning Article 7 of the U .N. 
Draft Agreement by supporting its inclusion. The State Department should oppose any 
meeting of a conference of pleni-potentiaries as superfluous; the Draft satisfies American 
needs. If further delay in the adoption and implementation of the U .N. Draft occurs, the 
State. Department should attempt to create bilateral agreements with West Germany, 
France and Japan. An agreement between these nations will effectively prevent corporate 
bribery and may be easier to achieve than a consensus in the United Nations. 
203 The OECD is the successor institution to the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, which distributed Marshall Aid following the Second World War. H. AUBREY, 
ATLANTIC. ECONOMIC COOPERATION 21-27 (1967). The signatories of the Guidelines comprise 
twenty-three industrialized countries, including the United States, and account for 60% 
of the world's industrial production and over 90% of the world's multinational corpora-
tions. THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A BusINESS APPRAISAL 5 (P. 
Coolidge, G. Spina & D. Wallace eds. 1977). 
The International Chamber of Commerce has also been active in com batting extortion 
and bribery. See Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, the report of the I.C.C. 
Commission on Ethical Practices, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 417 (1978). 
201 The Code of Conduct is divided into two sections, one of which, "Guidelines for 
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participation in local political activities should be avoided. 205 
The OECD Guidelines require the disclosure of certain perti-
nent information. Thus, multinational enterprises provide infor-
mation on their structures, activities and policies to improve pub-
lic understanding. This disclosure supplements the information 
required to be disclosed under the national law of the countries 
within which multinationals operate. The guidelines specifically 
require nine disclosures, of which four are relevant to bribery.208 
These four relate to the capital structure and holdings of the 
enterprise, and are different in effect from the accounting stan-
dards of the FCP A. 207 
The OECD guidelines are wholy voluntary and are not legally 
enforceable. Moreover, they are vague, and often merely ask the 
corporation to obey the laws of the host nation. The guidelines 
condemn only "improper" or legally impermissible activities. 
Nonetheless, the OECD is an influential organization among in-
dustrial governments, and it may prompt these nations to enact 
internal legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The FCPA was prompted by immense public outcry, both here 
and abroad, following the revelations about bribery in Japan, the 
Netherlands and Italy. The Congress reacted by unanimously 
Multinational Enterprises; General Policies," specifically deals with illicit payments. See 
Vogelar, Multinational Enterprises: The Guidelines in Practice, OECD OBSERVER, May 
1977, at 7-8. 
,.. Enterprises should 
(7) not render and they should not be solicited or expected to render any bribe 
or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant or holder of 
public office; (8) unless legally permissible, not make contributions to candidates 
for political office or to political parties or other political organizations; (9) ab-
stain from any improper involvement in local political activities. 
OECD OBSERVER, July/August 1976, at 12-13. These Guidelines are far broader than the 
FCPA and the U.N. Draft Agreement, prohibiting even "grease money." 
zoe Disclosure under the OECD should include: 
(i) the structure of the enterprise, showing the name and location of the parent 
company, its main affiliates, its percentage ownership, direct and indirect, in 
these affiliates, including shareholdings between them; 
(ii) the geographical areas where the operations are carried out and the principal 
activities carried on therein by the parent company and the main affiliates; 
(iii) the operating results and sales by geographical area and the sales in the major 
lines of business for the enterprise as a whole; 
(iv) significant new capital investment by geographical area lmd, as far as practic-
able, by major lines of business for the enterprise. 
Id. at 13-14. See also Freedman, International Minimum Disclosure and Procedural Rules, 
5 SEC REG. L.J. 259 (1977). These Guidelines are not specifically designed to detect 
bribery, and thus, even full compliance could leave many bribes undetected. 
m The FCPA requires controls over the spending and recording; the disclosure of mate-
rial facts are then required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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passing the FCPA. The "crisis," however, has disappeared from 
the headlines, and now two tasks remain to be accomplished: 
courts must clarify the FCPA's prohibitions, and the State De-
partment must achieve an effective international prohibition. 
Corruption in government contracts has become one of the 
most serious ethical questions in recent years. The Act will be 
constructive in preventing corruption in developed nations where 
transactions are more openly reported and enforcement capabili-
ties are stronger so that wrongdoing may be detected. These are 
also the nations whose governmental integrity most concerns the 
United States. Third world nations worried about the detrimental 
effects of corruption should welcome the Act. On the other hand, 
in other countries where illicit payments are an accepted, noncon-
troversial method of business, the Act may become a trap for 
basically honest businessmen. There is no convenient answer for 
the executive faced with a payment demand from abroad. If he 
or she accedes, the payment may be discovered and he or she niay 
be imprisoned. If the payment i~ refused, the business may be 
destroyed. Only the courts, by adopting a flexible, relative defini-
tion of corruption, and the State Department, by achieving a 
multinational prohibition, can blunt the horns of this dilemma. 
-Fredric Bryan Lesser 
